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Estate Planning and the
Insurance Trust
by Lee Slosberg
Although there are many approaches to estate plan-
ning including the individual's desire to exercise prudent
financial management during his lifetime, or to provide
for the proper administration of his estate after his death
for the maximum benefit of his legatees, one of the pri-
mary purposes of good planning is the minimization or
elimination of death taxes, especially the federal estate
tax, in order to conserve as much of the estate as possi-
ble.
The federal estate tax is imposed on a decedent's es-
tate for the right to transmit the property to his heirs or
other donees, as distinguished from the state inheritance
tax, imposed on the donee for the right to receive part
of an estate. Before the federal estate tax came into be-
ing in 1916, distribution of a decedent's estate was fairly
simple. However, the federal estate tax has become a
significant and burdensome factor in prudent estate
planning.
When an individual thinks about passing on property
at death he generally thinks of a will. Many assume that
the entire estate passes by will, and are unaware that
certain assets, such as life insurance proceeds, which are
payable to a named beneficiary under the terms of the
policy, do not.
When a husband purchases life insurance, life insur-
ance agents often recommend that he make the wife the
owner and the premium payer of his policies, in addition
to making her the beneficiary, in an attempt to keep
those death proceeds out of his estate, thereby lowering
his federal estate tax liability. In many situations this
would serve to delay the estate tax liability until the sub-
sequent death of his wife. This works only so long as the
decedent or the decedent's estate has no more than a 5
percent reversionary interest in the proceeds of the pol-
icy. The decedent may exercise none of the so-called in-
cidents of ownership at the time of his death, either
alone or in conjunction with any other person. 1
Another means by which a married individual can
lower his gross estate is through the "federal marital de-
duction". A portion of the estate is bequeathed to the
surviving spouse, and under certain conditions, shel-
tersid from the estate tax. Prior to 1977, the maximum
deduction allowed was 50% of the decedent's adjusted
gross estate. The new rules permit a $250,000 marital
deduction by estates of $500,000 or less, regardless of
the customary 50 percent limit,2 as long as the estate tax
marital deduction does not exceed the amount actually
passing to the surviving spouse. 3 Because substantial tax
savings can be realized, the marital deduction is cur-
rently one of the most helpful estate planning tools.
Life insurance proceeds paid outright to the spouse as
beneficiary qualify for the marital deduction for estate
tax purposes. 4 Proceeds payable under a policy's op-
tional modes of settlement must meet certain require-
ments. The insurance company must hold the proceeds,
to be paid out by agreement under one of the
company's optional modes of settlement. These optional
modes include payment of interest only or life income
with a period certain or fixed amount. The payment of
installments or interest must begin no later than thirteen
months after the decedent's death and must be at least
annual payments. The surviving spouse must have the
exclusive power of appointment over the proceeds, ex-
ercisable either by will, or during spouse's lifetime, or
both.5 Although proceeds from an insurance policy are
excluded from gross income to the surviving spouse, the
interest earned on those proceeds is not. If the surviving
spouse receives the proceeds under an installment op-
tion, she may exclude up to $1,000 of interest annu-
ally.6 Bear in mind that when the surviving spouse dies,
the assets of the first spouse's estate are again subject to
taxation. If the estate passes to a non-spouse, it does so
without the benefit of a marital deduction.
A life insurance trust is another valuable estate plan-
ning device to be considered, as a means to minimize
tax exposure of the estate, including tax exposure on the
death of the spouse, with a provision for a residuary
trust. Simply stated, a trust exists where one party, the
grantor, transfers legal title to a second party, the
trustee, for the benefit of a third party, the trust benefi-
ciary (for example: husband to trustee for benefit of
wife). The legal rights of control and ownership are with
the trustee, subject to his legal duty to perform as di-
rected by the grantor, while the enjoyment of the benefi-
cial or equitable rights to the property are with the trust
beneficiary.
7
One of the most important uses of the trust is in family
settlement, as a trust can provide essential flexibility. The
trust instrument offers an ideal method for the grantor to
distribute his estate directly to the members of his family
as he desires and to impose duties directly on the
trustee. The trust also provides protection for those ben-
eficiaries lacking the ability to manage, by placing the
management and administration of the property in the
hands of a capable manager trustee. A trust, then, can
provide for prudent management and protection of trust
assets, protection of beneficiaries, and tax savings.
A trust can be a living trust, created and effective dur-
ing the grantor's lifetime, or a testamentary trust, created
by the grantor's will and effective only after his death.
The living trust can be either revocable, with the grantor
reserving the right to terminate the trust, or irrevocable.
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Although there are a number of advantages to the revo-
cable trust, there is the distinct disadvantage that income
from the trust could be taxed to the grantor and the pro-
perty of the trust would be subject to the federal estate
tax. While an irrevocable trust requires the grantor to re-
linquish control over the assets, by so doing the grantor
gains certain income and estate tax savings. The life in-
surance trust is a special kind of living trust which acts as
a repository for the proceeds of life insurance policies
and can be either revocable or irrevocable. The revoca-
ble life insurance trust, like other revocable trusts, does
not have the income and estate tax advantages of the ir-
revocable trust, but is an ideal instrument for making
certain that the objectives of the grantor are carried out
at his death. It allows the grantor broad flexibility to ef-
fect certain discretionary powers that insurance com-
panies are often unable or unwilling to provide; for ex-
ample, provision for the management expertise of a
trustee, or termination or alteration of the trust as the
grantor deems desirable. There is the further advantage
that insurance proceeds in a living trust are not subject
to probate, thus eliminating certain administrative ex-
penses and allowing immediate liquidity. In addition, in-
surance proceeds paid to a life insurance trust are gener-
ally not subject to the claims of creditors.
Revocable life insurance trusts are often used as the
ultimate repositories for part or all of the probate pro-
perty after death. If the legal requirements of state law
are met, an individual can provide in his will that after
his estate is settled, his probate property be "poured
over" into the life insurance trust where it can be man-
aged under the same provisions as the insurance pro-
ceeds. If a husband's estate consists principally of life in-
surance, it might be a good idea to create an insurance
trust as a means of administering the entire estate.
One of the most effective ways of reducing an
individual's gross taxable estate is by the absolute trans-
fer of the ownership of existing insurance policies to an
irrevocable trust. If the gift is made more than three
years before death, none of the proceeds, except for the
value of premiums paid within three years of death, will
be included in the gross estate.8 The primary advantage
of transferring life insurance is that it usually has a rela-
tively low current value for transfer purposes compared
to the larger face value that can be removed from the
taxable estate. The entire value of the transfer above the
$3,000 annual "per donee" exclusion is added into the
gross estate for those transfers after 1976.
One major drawback of an irrevocable life insurance
trust is the very fact that it is irrevocable and the grantor
must relinquish control over the assets and cannot re-
cover them. Notwithstanding the possible estate tax sav-
ings, there may be compelling reasons for retaining con-
trol over the assets and careful client counseling is
imperative.
If the grantor is concerned about flexibility, he can
grant a trust beneficiary the power to redirect the dispo-
sition of the property through a special power of ap-
pointment, without adverse consequences, e.g., a hus-
band could provide for his wife to appoint the property
to their children, or a grandparent could provide that a
son appoint the property to his children. Note, however,
that transfer by appointment of a son to grandchildren
makes the transfer subject to generation skipping tax. As
long as the estate of the holder of the power and its
creditors are excluded as appointees, the special power
qualifies for estate and gift tax purposes.
9
An irrevocable life insurance trust must also contend
with the requirements of the gift tax, if the trust is cre-
ated in the grantor's lifetime. The Internal Revenue
Code allows an annual $3,000 tax exclusion for gifts of
a present interest, i.e., where the donee has an immedi-
ate and unrestricted right to the property. Where the
benefits are restricted, or are to be enjoyed sometime in
the future, the donee can be said to have a gift of a "fu-
ture interest", which would not qualify for the annual
exclusion. The Internal Revenue Code makes it quite
clear that the gift exclusion is only available for gifts of
other than future interest in property. 10 This becomes
particularly significant when gifts are made in trust. For
example, if the trust is funded with life insurance in or-
der to provide benefits in the future, the gift could be
considered a gift of future interest and would, therefore,
not qualify for the gift tax annual exclusion.
There is a well known device that could be used to
solve the "future interest" problem by giving the trust
beneficiary the immediate and unrestricted right to with-
draw trust assets. These gifts, often referred to as
Crummy powers, provide the beneficiary with a pro-
perty interest equivalent to that of absolute ownership,
thereby amounting to a "present interest". By utilizing
such a device in the irrevocable life insurance trust, and
by providing notice to the beneficiary that the power ex-
ists, most and perhaps all the contributions to the trust
should qualify for the, annual exclusion as "present inter-
est" gifts. The Internal Revenue Service appears to re-
gard notification to the trust beneficiaries of their rights
of withdrawl of the funds a very necessary ingredient for
enabling the Crummy powers to qualify as a gift of
present interest. 12
Estate planning is a vast and complicated area due to
the fact that individual needs are so varied. Life insur-
ance is a necessary element in proper estate planning
and one of the best devices available for the transfer of
dollars with minimum tax consequences. While the es-
tate tax liability cannot always be eliminated, its reduc-
tion through planning can go a long way to assure that
AL/I
an individual's objectives for the financial stability of his
family are carried out after his death.
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Sex & Law in Recent
Decisions
By: Harold D. Norton & Linda Lee Panlilio
A brief review of some selected 1980 decisions from
the Courts of Appeal of Maryland and the Regional
United States District Courts and Courts of Appeal gives
an indication of the current trend in issues concerning
sex and the law.
TITLE VII'
Sexual harassment is now generally recognized as ac-
tionable under federal law.
2
The United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia in Williams v. Civiletti,3 added to "the foundation
of a growing body of law providing remedies for ...
sexual harassment ' 4 by holding that a woman's dis-
missal from employment for rejecting her supervisor's
sexual advances violated Title VII.5
In Mazus v. Department of Transportation,6 the plain-
tiff failed to convince the United States District for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania that the state's patronage
system constituted a discriminatory practice prescribed
by Tide VII or that it violated her freedom of political as-
sociation. The plaintiff claimed that the goal of the pa-
tronage system was to hire a work force composed of
males.
In Rogers v. McCall,7 where a male plaintiff attempted
to establish a prima facie case using comparative evi-
dence, the D.C. court noted that promotion of a female
parole officer instead of her male counterpart "in no
way diminished or increased (his) eligibility for promo-
tion," 8 and was therefore nondiscriminatory.
Other noteworthy decisions resolved procedural is-
sues, holding, for example, that the three year District of
Columbia statute of limitations applies to back pay re-
coverable under Title VII. 9
Construing the "relation back" provision of Federal
Rule 15, in Kuhn v. Philadelphia Elec. Co.,i0 the District
Court for Penngylvania determined that an individual
class member's Title VII action commenced on the date
of her "consent to become party plaintiff"ll rather than
the date the original class action was filed. This issue was
considered by the court to be a case of federal first im-
pression.
Separate but interrelated corporations were treated as
a single entity for the jurisdictional requirements of Title
VII and the Equal Pay Act 12 by the Pennsylvania East-
ern District, 13 in Ratcliffe v. Ins. Co. of North America.
The same court spelled out federal pleading require-
ments for claims brought pursuant to Title V1114 (failure
to allege sex based discrimination constituted failure to
allege jurisdiction); the Equal Pay Act' 5 (claim must, at
least indirectly, allege disparity in wages); the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution 16 (claim
must allege inadequacy of statutory remedies); and Civil
Rights Act provisions other than Title V11 17 (claim must
plead that the defendant acted under color of state law
in section 1983 action).
Proof requirements under Title VII1 8 were the subject
of many recent federal decisions. In a case where "busi-
ness necessity" was claimed as a justification for unequal
treatment, the female plaintiff was able to refute the de-
fense by establishing that she and other women em-
ployees were able to perform all tasks included in the
job analysis.' 9 In another case, a woman who worked as
a foreign language broadcaster for Voice of America,
through purchase order contracts rather than employ-
ment contracts, was held not to be an "employee within
the meaning of Title VII."
20
In Kunda v. Muhlenberg College21 the United States
Court of Appeals found employment discrimination
based on sex for failure to promote or grant tenure to a
female college professor. The District Court based its de-
cision on evidence that the complainant met all promo-
tion and tenure requirements set forth in the Muhlen-
berg College Faculty Handbook, and that she "was
regarded by her colleagues as an excellent teacher. .."
The Court of Appeals simply noted that the finding was
not clearly erroneous under Federal Rule 52(a).2 2
Finally, in Clark u. Alexander,23 where Title VII pro-
vided the basis for a cause of action regarding discrimi-
nation in the military, Judge Robinson commented:
"The evidence establishes beyond doubt that pervasive
systematic defects existed and continue to exist in the
(Department of Army) Career Program," 24 leading "in-
exorably to the inference of discriminatory intent."
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